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While the press and punditsgreeted the release of theNuclear Posture Review(NPR) in January 2002 with
a flurry of commentaries and outcries,
there has been little analytical follow-up
from the academic and think-tank commu-
nities on the far-reaching implications of
this document for specific regional geopo-
litical environments such as the Persian
Gulf or the wider Middle East.
This is surprising, since implementation
of the NPR over the next decade promises
to affect profoundly the shape and content
of the nation’s national security strategy
writ large and, in turn, security strategies
developed to pursue regional objectives in
each of the geographic theaters around the
world.  Nowhere is this more the case than
in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
The NPR indicates that the United States
is making the region a central focus of the
redesigned strategic deterrent, now com-
prising nuclear and conventional compo-
nents, with conventional long-range preci-
sion-strike weapons functioning in a
“strategic” context.  While it might be too
dramatic to suggest that the Middle East
effectively replaces the Soviet Union as
the central targeting requirement for sizing
and configuring the U.S. strategic deter-
rent, it seems clear that regional contingen-
cies will assume a more prominent role in
the nation’s nuclear strategy.1
This paper will examine the implica-
tions of the NPR for U.S. security strategy
in the Middle East, framing NPR imple-
mentation in the context of theoretical
literature surrounding the role of nuclear
weapons in deterrent and coercive political
strategies.    The paper will also highlight
policy challenges facing the United States
as it seeks to use the reconfigured strategic
deterrent as a means to promote its
interests and achieve its objectives in this
volatile region.
To illustrate the difficulties of applying
the strategic deterrent as a tool for regional
security, the paper will apply the theoretical
framework to an examination of the
coercive/compellant framework with Iraq
from 1991-2003.  The study will conclude
with an assessment of the contributions,
positive or negative, that the redesigned
strategic deterrent could make toward the
building of a qualitatively new regional
security order in the post-Saddam Middle
East.
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THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The NPR represents strands of
continuity and change when viewed in the
context of the historical role that nuclear
weapons traditionally have played in U.S.
security strategy in the Middle East.
Throughout most of the Cold War, nuclear
weapons were seen as the ultimate guar-
antor of the broader military mission to
“defend the region” against encroachment
from outside powers like the Soviet Union.
Planning for the use of nuclear weapons in
the Middle East began in earnest in the
early 1950s as military planners looked for
ways to redress Soviet conventional
military superiority around the world.  In
June 1950, the National Security Council
issued a report (NSC 26/3) titled Demoli-
tion and Abandonment of Oil Facilities
and Fields in the Middle East. The report
addressed the possibility of plugging Saudi
oil wells “…as a means of conservation
and denial during enemy occupation.”
Nuclear weapons were looked at as a
possible tool to deny the Soviets access to
the oil fields.  The report found, “Denial of
wells by radiological means can be accom-
plished to prevent an enemy from utilizing
the oil, but it could not prevent him from
forcing ‘expendable’ Arabs to enter the
contaminated areas to open well heads and
deplete the reservoirs. Therefore, aside
from other ill effects on the Arab popula-
tion, it is not considered that radiological
means are practicable as a conservation
measure.”2
Such was the initial (and unsuccessful)
attempt to find a useful role for nuclear
weapons in regional strategy.  But nuclear
weapons eventually came to be seen as
one tool available to the United States as it
sought to protect its interests in the Middle
East and counter the Soviet Union’s
conventional military superiority along the
Turkish and Iranian borders.
Applying the strategic deterrent in
other regional scenarios periodically
surfaced during the Cold War as a way to
deter Soviet involvement in regional affairs.
In October 1973, U.S. forces – including
the Strategic Air Command – were placed
on heightened alert in response to possible
Soviet military intervention to keep the
Israelis from destroying the surrounded
Egyptian Third Army.  During the crisis,
Henry Kissinger sent Soviet leader
Brezhnev a message stating that the
introduction of Soviet troops into the region
would represent a violation of the recently
signed Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Nuclear War.3   The implication of
Kissinger’s message was obvious: intro-
duction of Soviet troops could have led to a
nuclear face-off between the Cold War
antagonists.
In January 1980, following the take-
over of the American embassy in Iran and
in response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, President Carter stated, “An
attempt by an outside force to gain control
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault on the vital interests of the
United States of America, and such an
assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.”4   At
the time, Carter’s statement was widely
considered to encompass the use of
nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet
advance into Iran.  In February 1980,
details of a Pentagon report emerged
indicating that the United States might have
to use tactical nuclear weapons in response
to any Soviet military advance toward the
Gulf.5   The Pentagon study, Capabilities
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in the Persian Gulf, helped form the basis
for recommendations to create the Rapid
Joint Deployment Task Force, which later
became the U.S. Central Command.
In the spring of 1996, the application of
the strategic deterrent in the region oc-
curred in the context of counter-
proliferation policy.  The United States
detected construction of an underground
site at Tarhuna in Libya that was widely
believed to be related to Libya’s production
of chemical-warfare agents.   Secretary of
Defense William Perry stated that the
United States would consider a wide range
of options to ensure that Tarhuna did not
become operational.  In discussing the
Libyan site, Perry stated that any country
attacking the United States with chemical
weapons would “…have to fear the
consequences of a response from any
weapon in our inventory.”  He further
elaborated that “we could make a devas-
tating response without the use of nuclear
weapons, but we would not forswear that
possibility.”6
Potential use of nuclear weapons
emerged in wars with Iraq in 1991 and
again in 2003.  Statements made by a
variety of senior government officials in
both crises reflected a belief by decision
makers that the nuclear arsenal had a role
to play in deterring Saddam from using his
chemical and biological weapons against
coalition forces.  Specific warnings were
made by senior U.S. officials to Saddam in
both cases.  Secretary of State James
Baker passed a message to Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz in January 1991 stating
that any Iraqi use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) would be met with
overwhelming force.  Similar public
references were made by a variety of U.S.
officials before Operation Iraqi Freedom.
NPR AND THE MIDDLE EAST
A review of the historical framework
reveals the episodic appearance of the
region in U.S. nuclear strategy.  During
times of crisis, decision makers drew upon
the strategic deterrent; and with the
subsiding of each crisis references to
nuclear weapons subsided.  The focus of
the strategic deterrent during the Cold War
was on the Soviet Union and the various
geographic theaters of conflict during the
period.
But with the passing of the Soviet
threat and the emergence of a new secu-
rity environment defined by rogue states,
transnational terrorist organizations and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the strategic deterrent has found a
new series of missions that seem particu-
larly prominent in the Middle East and
Persian Gulf.  A reading of the NPR
suggests that the strategic deterrent will be
applied on a more or less ongoing basis in
the region as a means to achieve a number
of short- and longer-term strategic and
policy objectives.
The NPR implies that the defense of
Israel represents a core mission for the
strategic deterrent by identifying several
near-term contingencies involving an attack
on Israel that could lead to the use of
nuclear weapons by the United States.7
Moreover, with (as of this writing) two
countries in the region (Syria and Iran) still
supporting terrorism and possessing
programs to develop WMD, the strategic
force has two other potential targets.  And,
last but not least, the region seems implic-
itly highlighted by the NPR’s treatment of
the targeting problem posed by hardened
and deeply buried targets that cannot be
threatened by conventional weapons.8   As
noted in the NPR, these targets necessitate
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a new family of munitions including low-
yield nuclear weapons that may have to be
fielded over the next decade.  These
munitions must be developed in part
because of the characteristics of the
strategic targeting problem in countries
such as Iran and Syria.9
The NPR identifies Iraq, Iran, Syria
and Libya (in addition to North Korea) as
countries that “…could be involved in
immediate, potential or unexpected
[nuclear] contingencies. All have
longstanding hostility towards the United
States and its security partners…. All
sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have
active WMD and missile programs.”10
Saddam’s forcible removal and Libya’s
apparent abandonment of its WMD
programs presumably delete these coun-
tries from the potential list of contingencies,
still leaving Iran and Syria as countries in
the region that might be involved in situa-
tions requiring the use of nuclear weapons.
The NPR strongly implies a U.S.
commitment to use nuclear weapons in the
defense of Israel, stating that an “immedi-
ate contingency” that might lead to the use
of nuclear weapons includes “…an Iraqi
attack on Israel….” While such an attack
clearly has been obviated with Saddam’s
removal, it stands to reason that the same
logic would apply to a Syrian or Iranian
attack on Israel.  Both Syria and Iran
maintain well-established WMD capabili-
ties, and both maintain longstanding and
overt hostility towards Israel.  This chain of
logic suggests that defending Israel from
an attack by Syria or Iran is a core mission
for the strategic deterrent.
While the NPR specifically refers to
several regions, the strategic deterrent is
assigned a broad array of functions that
are particularly salient within the Middle
East regional context:
• Assurance:  “U.S. nuclear forces will
continue to provide assurance to security
partners in the presence of known or
suspected threats of nuclear, biological or
chemical attacks or in the event of surpris-
ing military developments. This assurance
can serve to reduce the incentives for
friendly countries to acquire nuclear
weapons of their own to deter such threats
and circumstances.”11
• Dissuasion: The wide array of
conventional and nuclear capabilities in the
strategic deterrent “…may dissuade a
potential adversary from pursuing threaten-
ing capabilities.” 12
• Deterrence: “[Missile] [D]efense of
U.S. territory and power-projection forces,
including U.S. forces abroad, combined
with the certainty of U.S. ability to strike in
response, can bring into better balance
U.S. stakes and risks in a regional confron-
tation and thus reinforce the credibility of
U.S. guarantees designed to deter attacks
on allies and friends.” 13
• Defeat: “Composed of both nuclear
and non-nuclear weapons, the strike
element of the New Triad can provide
flexibility in the design and conduct of
military campaigns to defeat opponents
decisively.  Non-nuclear strike capabilities
may be particularly useful to limit collateral
damage and conflict escalation.  Nuclear
weapons could be employed against targets
able to withstand non-nuclear attack (for
example, deep underground bunkers or bio-
weapon facilities.)”14
The NPR identifies the strategic
deterrent and its nuclear component as a
tool that can help support a broad array of
policy objectives.  The NPR’s broadly
defined strategic objectives of assure,
deter, dissuade and defeat mirror the
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verbiage in the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). 15   According to Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, these con-
cepts represent “…key goals that will
guide the development of U.S. forces and
capabilities, their deployment and
use….”16  The same formulations appear in
the Bush administration’s National Security
Strategy report.17
The reason to belabor what might
seem an obvious point is simple: the
strategic deterrent performs an integral
(even a core) function in the diverse array
of capabilities available to the National
Command Authority.  The strategic nuclear
force is seen as a tool to address a wide
variety of different threats in different
mission scenarios requiring the threat and
actual use of force. As described in the
NPR and other strategy documents, it
seems clear that nuclear weapons and the
strategic deterrent will be applied in many
peacetime and wartime scenarios short of
massive retaliation and all-out war.  That is,
the NPR assigns nuclear weapons many
roles beyond simple retaliation for a WMD
attack on the United States or its allies. As
such, it extends the function of nuclear
weapons beyond simple deterrence of
enemy behavior.
The NPR does state that the strategic
nuclear force can serve as a powerful
deterrent to preserve the status quo and
prevent the outbreak of interstate conflict.
However, Bush administration strategy
documents further assert that the U.S.
nuclear arsenal can help change the
behavior of states through dissuasion,
which seeks to convince states of the
futility of entering into a direct competition
with the United States.
The documents also highlight the
salience of threats coming from the spread
of WMD together with terrorism.  The
strategic deterrent is presented as a tool to
deter states from providing WMD to
terrorist clients and from attacking the
United States and its friends and allies.
While many of the Bush administration’s
strategy documents show a lack of confi-
dence in applying deterrence to non-state
actors, the documents expand the role of
deterrence to provision of WMD to
terrorists by so-called “rogue states.”18
Hence, not only is a state such as Iran
deterred from undertaking offensive
operations against its neighbors, but it is
presumably deterred from providing certain
mass-effect technologies, materials and
weapons to non-state actors.
In addition to these aforementioned
broadly defined deterrent objectives, the
strategic deterrent’s family of precision
conventional and nuclear-strike munitions is
also presented as a powerful tool of
counterproliferation policy.  The nuclear
and conventional components together are
presented as tools both to deter the spread
of WMD to non-state actors and also to
deny those states with WMD the advan-
tages that these capabilities might present
in an actual conflict.  Should WMD be
used against the United States or its
regional partners, the strategic arsenal is
meant to decisively defeat an adversary
through the combined capabilities of the
nuclear and conventional strike compo-
nents of the strategic deterrent.  The
strategic arsenal’s counterproliferation
mission also seems particularly highlighted
by the NPR’s treatment of the strategic
targeting problem posed by hardened
underground targets that cannot be held at
risk by conventional munitions.
The prospect of using the deterrent in
short-notice operations also is strongly
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implied by the NPR’s call to replace the
cumbersome Single Integrated Operational
Plan with something called “adaptive
planning,” in which components of the
strategic nuclear forces can be integrated
into responses to ongoing contingencies on
reasonably short notice.  Making the
strategic arsenal more responsive in short-
notice contingencies seems particularly
applicable to potential counterforce strikes
against WMD and leadership targets.
In applying the strategic arsenal to
actual wartime use, the Bush administra-
tion repeats formulations from previous
administrations reserving the right to use
nuclear weapons in certain contingencies.
As stated in the National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction:
“The United States will continue to make
clear it reserves the right to respond with
overwhelming force – including through
resort to all our options – to the use of
WMD against our forces abroad and
friends and allies.”19
These broadly defined political and
military objectives suggest certain identifi-
able formulations about the role the strate-
gic deterrent will play in regional security
strategy:
• Deter and defend attacks against
forward-deployed forces;
• Deter and defend Israel from attack
by adversaries using conventional or non-
conventional means, i.e., WMD;
• Convince states with WMD or those
contemplating the pursuit of WMD to
abandon those programs, i.e., “dissuasion”
of competitive behavior by opponents at
the strategic level;
• Convince states either engaged in or
supporting terrorism to cease these activi-
ties (known in the broader security litera-
ture as “compellance,” in which an adver-
sary is convinced to stop doing activities
it has already started, and possibly to
reverse any gains made);
• Deter states that possess WMD from
passing these weapons to terrorist organi-
zations targeting either the United States or
Israel;
• Present the NCA with a flexible and
diverse array of attack options (both
conventional and nuclear) to defeat adver-
saries in regional contingencies, such as:
 – Counterforce operations against
WMD and regime targets;
 – Tactical support to theater com
manders;
 – Strategic use in situations requiring
massive retaliation;
• Assure Israel of the U.S. defense
commitment, which, in turn, can act as a
deterrent to aggressive Israeli actions
against its neighbors;
• Assure coalition partners throughout
the region that the United States can and
will use force to deter attacks on these
partners and, by extension, defend them
using the strategic deterrent if necessary.
The above functions are not specifi-
cally articulated in any strategy document
but represent my judgments on how the
QDR/NPR requirements match up against
U.S. national-security objectives in the
Middle East.  Assuming that these objec-
tives represent reasonable statements
about the role of the strategic U.S. nuclear
arsenal in the region, it is fair to state that
the NPR associates nuclear weapons with
a variety of military and political objectives
in the region.
NPR, THEORY AND PRACTICE
Widening the potential political and
military applications of the strategic nuclear
force is of particular significance in the
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context of the regional environment.  The
region boasts not only all the salient
threatening features of the international
environment (terrorism, WMD and instabil-
ity), but it is also a region where systemic
interstate communication problems impose
enormous obstacles for the United States
in operationalizing complicated political and
military strategies.  These communications
issues, which will be highlighted below,
represent a critical issue for analysis by
policy makers as they determine the role
for the strategic nuclear force in regional
security strategy.
Implementing the NPR in the region
suggests an interesting confluence of
theoretical approaches on the role of
nuclear weapons in strategy and the role
that perceptions, signals and communica-
tions play in interstate relations.  The NPR
implies that the strategic deterrent and, by
extension, nuclear weapons, have a
prominent role to play in a family of
coercive political and military strategies –
in which states either threaten, or in some
cases actually use, force to achieve
political objectives.  Associating the
strategic nuclear force with coercive and
deterrent strategies suggests the applicabil-
ity of a theoretical framework articulated
during the late 1950s and early 1960s by
Thomas Schelling in his works The Strat-
egy of Conflict and Arms and Influ-
ence.20  Schelling argued that nuclear
weapons could serve as a useful tool to
policy makers engaged in what he called
the “diplomacy of violence.”21   Schelling
believed that nuclear weapons represented
a tool for policy makers that could be
wielded through strategies of deterrence,
compellance and coercion.  The NPR’s
broadly defined missions for the strategic
deterrent suggest that the Bush administra-
tion also believes this to be the case.
Schelling believed that nuclear weap-
ons could play a role in the interstate
bargaining process by discouraging an
adversary from taking actions, forcing an
adversary to change behavior and, if
necessary, serve as tools to achieve
tactical and strategic objectives once
hostilities had been initiated.  In his view,
nuclear weapons could play a role in
limiting the scope of armed conflict once
begun, since the “escalation dominance” it
afforded could convince an adversary of
the futility of continuing the conflict, and
hence bring the action to a close on
favorable terms.
Schelling developed a model to analyze
interstate conflict in his work The Strategy
of Conflict. Strategies of deterrence,
compellance and coercion, Schelling
argued, could be placed into a framework
of game theory called “a theory of interde-
pendent decision.”  His theory posited that
deterrence, compellance and coercion
could be applied to achieve objectives as
part of the interstate bargaining process.22
His bargaining process needed a number of
critical elements: (1) Actors in the system
had to act rationally “…motivated by a
conscious calculation of advantages, a
calculation that in turn is based on an
explicit and internally consistent value
system.”23   (2) Actors had to have certain
common interests and mutual dependence
even if they simultaneously had other
conflicting interests (actors with totally
opposed interests would lead to wars of
extermination – a rarity in the international
system).24  (3) There must be a peacetime
and wartime communications system for
actors to convey intentions as an enabler
for bargaining.25  Under Schelling’s theory,
operationalizing the concepts of deterrence
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and compellance in the bargaining process
occurred when states threatened the use of
force and, if warranted, used force to
inflict successive levels of pain on an
adversary to achieve a successful out-
come.26   Schelling acknowledged that the
bargaining process had one important
limitation – when asymmetries in communi-
cations prevented actors from receiving
signals of intent.27
The issues of actor rationality and the
function of interstate communications have
always troubled analysts in thinking through
the implications of assigning roles to
nuclear weapons in deterrent and coercive
strategies.  Former Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara cogently expressed
these doubts during his University of
Michigan commencement address in June
1962, when he stated:
The mere fact that no nation could
rationally take steps leading to a
nuclear war does not guarantee that a
nuclear war cannot take place.  Not
only do nations sometimes act in ways
that are hard to explain on a rational
basis, but even when acting in a
‘rational’ way they sometimes, indeed
disturbingly often, will act on the
basis of misunderstandings of the true
facts of a situation. They misjudge the
way others will react, and the way
others will interpret what they are
doing.28
McNamara’s misgivings about the sup-
posed rationality of actors involved in
deterrent relationships are reflected in much
of the literature on deterrence theory.29
The problem of interstate communica-
tions – central to the application of
Schelling’s coercive-bargaining framework
– is systematically addressed by Robert
Jervis in his seminal work The Logic of
Images.30 Jervis analyzed the process
through which states drew inferences from
the actions of other states and, in addition,
how states could influence the inferences
being drawn by the desired actors.31
Jervis suggested that states communicate
with one another through a series of
images: an internal image developed for
internal audiences and an external image
presented to the world at large.  A central
feature of the system as described by
Jervis is that images constructed by states
constitute a powerful tool for deception –
they can be used to confuse actors. One of
the main points in The Logic of Images is
the central role that conscious deception
plays in international relations.32
Jervis’s theoretical frameworks on
perception and signaling suggest that
effective interstate communications are at
best problematic and, at worst, haphazard.
Sources of misperception, combined with
the complicated system of communicating
intent and developing indices, produce what
can only be described as a process prone
to uncertainty and unpredictability.  As
noted by Jervis, these difficulties can be
exacerbated in cross-cultural communica-
tions but can also occur even between
states with well-developed political and
cultural relationships.  For example, in his
book Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis
in Perspective, Richard Neustadt provides
a fascinating account of the inability of two
close allies – the United States and the UK
– to communicate effectively on an issue
of mutual interest and concern.33
Accepting that, as described in the
NPR, the U.S. strategic nuclear force is
intended to function on variety of different
levels within a framework of coercive
strategies, one might suggest that the
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theories of Schelling and Jervis need to be
re-examined by those seeking to apply
nuclear weapons as a policy tool in the
Middle East.  The confluence of the
Schelling-Jervis theoretical approaches
suggests a number of intertwined hypoth-
eses that should be reviewed during NPR
implementation:
(1)  To function effectively, coercive
strategies depend on common assumptions,
mutual dependence, rational actors and
effective communications.
(2) Successful coercive strategies
depend on a communications system that
allows actors to accurately convey and
receive intent.
(3) Inherent and systemic difficulties in
interstate communications can complicate
the interstate bargaining process.
(4) Absent a communication system
that accurately conveys and receives intent
within a coercive framework, actors may
not function predictably in accordance with
bargaining and game-theory assumptions.
(5) Implementing coercive strategies in
situations with acute communications
issues or illogical images could result in
unpredictable behavior and (at worst)
strategic instability due to actions by the
involved actors.
IMPLICATIONS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
During the Cold War, arms control
played an important role in establishing a
relatively structured communications
system between the United States and the
Soviet Union.  The talks themselves and the
accompanying informal interactions on the
margins of these meetings helped establish
a communications framework that enabled
the deterrent relationship at the strategic
level.  The arms-control process came to
be an important tool to maintain strategic
stability by, among other things, helping both
actors sort through the complicated process
of drawing inferences from signals and
indices. It also allowed the actors to take
unambiguous concrete actions (limiting
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, for
example), pursuant to an agreed-upon
framework that sought to introduce predict-
ability to the actors’ force structures.
Consistent with Schelling’s formula-
tions, this meant that the actors in the
bargaining process shared a basic set of
assumptions and could agree to pursue
compromise in certain aspects of their
relationships, while at the same time
allowing and even encouraging conflict to
continue in other areas.  And, consistent
with Jervis’s ideas, the actors had a
structured forum to convey intention and
develop indices to gauge the impact that
their signals were having.
In the Middle East, however, there
exists no institutionalized process for
adversaries to ensure structured communi-
cations on a routine basis outside of formal
political channels – and even these do not
exist in the cases of Iran and the United
States and Iran and Israel. Interstate
communications tend to occur through
other means: the media and more tradi-
tional forms of political or diplomatic
communications. These forms of communi-
cation leave a lot to be desired.  The
language of diplomacy, Jervis notes,
effectively constitutes its own “code” with
ambiguous and open-ended meanings.34
He neatly summarized the characteristics
of diplomatic language:
The complex signaling system is not
noiseless and unambiguous, and thus
signals are often intentionally unclear
even at the first, or semantic, level.
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This allows actors to issue signals
they can disown and gives them more
flexibility to explore possible politics
without changing others’ images of
themselves to their detriment.35
Communication through the media,
particularly in the Middle East, is even
more problematic.  Government-controlled
media throughout much of the Arab world
routinely push pronounced anti-American
and anti-Israeli messages, which make it a
poor channel through which to communi-
cate signals.
Perhaps most important, further
cloaking the interstate communications
process are differences flowing from
history, religion, ethnicity and particularly
distinct “national” identities as well as the
personalities of the leaders themselves.
Defining these differences between the
United States and the countries in the
region as “cultural” seems somehow
inadequate; a more complicated term is
really required.  However, the interaction
of these variables provides an important
founding basis for the images suggested by
Jervis that are integral parts of the inter-
state communications system.  If these
images are opaque, obscured or just plain
misperceived by the United States, it is
difficult to accurately convey intent through
the signaling process.  If the signaling
process does not work properly, then the
communications system cannot accurately
convey signals.
At the macro level, a classic example of
this phenomenon is the seemingly unending
efforts by the last two American administra-
tions to improve the “image” of the United
States throughout the Arab world.  One
commentator in the Middle East eloquently
described the systemic problems facing the
United States as follows:
The basic problem is that the Ameri-
can penchant for clarity and a neat,
explicit, black-and-white classification
of people’s identities and intentions
clashes badly with the Middle East’s
traditions of multiple identities,
sometimes hidden intentions, and
frequent imprecision in one’s stated
intentions….Arabs and Americans are
like ships passing in the night,
sounding their horns, firing their guns,
making known their views, but having
no impact on the other.36
Such basic communications difficulties
form an important and arguably vital
backdrop as policy makers start to think
through the implications of applying the
strategic deterrent within the region as
suggested by the NPR.  These communi-
cations difficulties imply that Schelling’s
bargaining process cannot work with any
degree of predictability – and may in fact
work illogically – due to the incongruence
of the respective images of the parties.
This incongruence, in turn, undermines the
ability of the strategic deterrent to function




Establishing the defense of Israel as a
core mission for the strategic deterrent in
some ways simply represents an
acknowledgement of what has been
apparent for the last quarter century: that
policy makers of both main political parties
in the United States regard the defense of
Israel as a “strategic” interest for the
United States.  While it is difficult to see
that Israel’s defense constitutes a classic
“realist” strategic interest for the United
States, the political relationship between the
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two countries has made it so.  An analytical
issue for policy makers is to examine
whether the U.S. “extended” deterrent for
Israel should be treated in the same context
as the extended deterrent on behalf of
Europe during the Cold War. In Cold War
Europe, the United States stationed nuclear
weapons on European soil, developed a
publicly stated doctrine governing the use
of nuclear weapons in a so-called “escala-
tion ladder,” and stated as a matter of
policy that the U.S. strategic nuclear
arsenal represented a part of the continuum
of capabilities that would be brought into
play if the situation warranted it.
The situation in Israel today is obvi-
ously very different.  Israel maintains a
public position of strategic ambiguity,
though there is little doubt that Israel is a
nuclear power with 100-400 weapons.37
Recent reports suggest that Israel has even
deployed nuclear weapons in subma-
rines.38   While the stationing of U.S.
nuclear weapons on Israeli soil might be
difficult politically for both countries,
parceling out other parts of the strategic
deterrent to Israel seems reasonable, as
was the case in Europe during the Cold
War.  One of the strategic deterrent’s new
components is strategic missile defense – a
capability that the Israelis might welcome
as an addition to the Arrow missile.  More-
over, if Israel, as suggested, is a strategic
partner, it also makes sense that precision-
strike conventional capabilities in the
strategic arsenal might be deployed for-
ward to Israeli soil.  As was the case with
NATO partners during the Cold War, Israel
could even be assigned “strategic” targets
in connection with ongoing contingencies
that would require use of the strategic
conventional and nuclear arsenal.
Having made these points, it is admit-
tedly difficult to envision a military require-
ment necessitating any of the above
actions.  The United States already has
significant forward-deployed forces in the
region at a variety of different locations, so
the stationing of weapons in Israel seems
redundant. Moreover, in terms of target
coverage, Israel offers nothing that could
not be satisfied with basing elsewhere in the
region. But if the NPR is to be taken
seriously, and if the United States is to
integrate the defense of Israel into the
missions assigned to the strategic nuclear
arsenal, policy makers should devote the
same analytical effort accorded to the
extended deterrent on European soil that
eventually resulted in the doctrine of flexible
response in 1967.  If nothing else, the
analytical effort would sort out some of the
complicated conceptual and policy issues of
associating the strategic nuclear and
conventional arsenal with Israel’s defense.
As part of this effort, policy makers
need to examine the commitment to Israel
in light of the NPR’s broadly stated objec-
tive of assuring friends and allies.   The
U.S. strategic arsenal is intended to assure
Israel (and other regional states) of the
U.S. commitment to its defense.  The
“assurance” flowing from the U.S. posture
is intended to influence Israeli behavior,
most obviously acting as a constraint on
Israel’s use of force against its neighbors
and vice versa.  The strategic arsenal
potentially could act both as a tool to
restrain overly aggressive Israeli actions
and to control conflict escalation.
Hence, determining how assurance will
work vis-à-vis Israel is a central challenge
for U.S. security strategy.  It might be
equally argued that the strategic umbrella
provided by U.S. forces could in fact
encourage Israel to act more aggressively
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than it otherwise would, since its actions
would be backed not just by its own
nuclear force but also by the thousands of
warheads in the U.S. arsenal and the array
of standoff conventional munitions used to
great effect in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In order to assess the impact that the
U.S. strategic arsenal and its associated
doctrine can have on Israeli behavior, an
analysis of Israeli views of compellance
and deterrence is essential.  A review of
literature on Israeli deterrence suggests a
striking and potentially dangerous variance
between U.S. and Israeli views of
compellance and deterrence. The U.S.
view of compellance is generally to avoid
escalation, while the Israelis actively seek
it.  Another way of describing this variance
is that the United States views
compellance and escalation like a pyramid
in which escalation proceeds incrementally.
By contrast, the Israeli view of
compellance and escalation is more like an
inverted pyramid in which escalation is
immediate, uncontrolled and overwhelm-
ing.39   This analysis suggests that the
Israelis have developed a compellence/
deterrence model that is founded on a
number of assumptions: (1) Israeli leaders
have historically sought to deliberately
provoke hostile Arab reactions in order to
establish dominance with an overwhelming
and disproportionate conventional re-
sponse. (2) Seeking an excuse to escalate
is a characteristic of Israel’s use of force
against its adversaries. (3) Bureaucratic
inertia and the role of military officials in
the decision-making process have contrib-
uted to a default position of conventional
escalation. (4) This approach has failed to
achieve Israel’s objective of security and
has in fact played a role in compromising
the ability of the actors to create a political
framework for negotiations.40
Understanding Israeli views of these
issues is of critical importance as policy
makers attempt to determine how the U.S.
strategic arsenal will interact with Israeli
views of compellance and deterrence.  The
preceding analysis suggests the importance
of arriving at a common set of U.S. and
Israeli assumptions to avoid escalation in a
crisis situation that might in certain circum-
stances involve the United States and its
strategic forces.
Syria a Target
Analysis of the historical record in Iraq
(which has only just begun) provides some
useful insights into an ongoing case of
applying coercive and compellant strategy
to Syria.  Restating the obvious is impor-
tant: the NPR suggests that Syria is a
primary country-specific target of the
strategic nuclear and conventional arsenal.
Damascus continues to receive particular
attention from U.S. policy makers due to
its active support of terrorist groups, its
overt hostility to Israel and its well-devel-
oped WMD infrastructure, particularly its
missile and chemical-warfare programs.
Pursuant to these threats, it seems clear
that U.S. forces are expected to support a
variety of deterrent and compellant objec-
tives that involve the threat and, if neces-
sary, the actual use of force in contingen-
cies that involve Syria.  Bush administra-
tion officials have in fact made a variety of
statements in the aftermath of Operation
Iraqi Freedom implying that the same
calculations made in deciding to use force
against Iraq also apply to Syria.41   The
U.S. nuclear and conventional arsenals are
expected to either directly support or help
accomplish the following objectives: (1)
deter an attack on Israel; (2) defeat Syria
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(using nuclear weapons if necessary)
should it attack Israel with WMD; (3)
convince Syrian leader Bashar Asad to
stop supporting terrorist groups targeting
the United States and its allies; (4) con-
vince Asad to forgo Syria’s WMD pro-
grams and disarm; and (5) provide the
national command authority with an array
of nuclear and conventional counterattack
options related to Syria’s WMD infrastruc-
ture, some of which is buried underground.
Israeli-Syrian Standoff
The case of Syria is also interesting
since the United States is imposing ex-
tended deterrence over an existing deterrent
relationship — Israeli nuclear weapons and
overwhelming conventional superiority, on
the one hand, and Syria’s well-developed
WMD capabilities (mainly long-range
missiles and chemical weapons) and inferior
conventional capabilities, on the other.
Imposing a U.S. coercive and deterrent
framework over this existing relationship
suggests that deterrence in this situation is a
multifaceted phenomenon functioning at
different levels with a wide variety of
variables. The relationships among these
variables need to be understood in the
context of NPR implementation.
These issues assume particular signifi-
cance in assessing the impact of NPR
implementation on the Israeli-Syrian
deterrent relationship.  The relationship is
highly unstable, with each side in an
avowedly hostile posture towards the other.
Syria uses terrorist surrogates to attack
Israel, while Israel responds with conven-
tional attacks on those surrogates.  In
October 2003, Israel bombed a target near
Damascus that was allegedly associated
with terrorist activities in the first such
attack deep into Syria since the 1973 war.
In response, Syrian Foreign Ministry
official Bushra Kanafani stated, “Syria
reserves the right to retaliate by all means
at its disposal.”42   Hizbollah officials made
similar statements of intent to respond in
the event of further Israeli attacks.43
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made
equally defiant comments, stating, “Israel
will not be deterred from protecting its
citizens and will strike its enemies in every
place and in every way.”44   The Bush
administration’s response was to caution
both parties but to emphasize Israel’s right
to defend itself.
The incident is only the latest indicator
in what is an obviously unstable political
relationship with the potential for escalation
stemming from a variety of factors.
Judging the “stability” of the Syria-Israel
deterrent relationship is problematic.  Both
actors may well have intuitively agreed
upon a series of “red lines” that form the
basis for a coercive bargaining framework.
Israel mounted the raid into Syria as a
signal of sorts, which, if nothing else,
demonstrated its overwhelming military
superiority and its willingness to use force
whenever it felt justified.  Syria’s response
recognized its inherent weakness but also
conveyed that there are limits beyond
which Syria cannot be pushed.  If the
preceding analysis about Israeli views of
deterrence has any validity, it is equally
plausible that Israel would have welcomed
escalation by the Syrians as a pretext for a
wider war.
Layering U.S. strategic forces over
this situation creates additional uncertain-
ties.  For example, it is unclear to what
extent either of the parties interacting in
this incident is aware that both are being
subjected to deterrent and compellant
strategies as suggested in the NPR.  So it
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seems manifestly unclear exactly how the
strategic arsenal is functioning in its role of
“assuring” Israeli decision makers of U.S.
commitment to Israel’s security.   And it
must be admitted that there is also no such
clarity on what impact the deterrent effect
is having on Syrian behavior.
Due to the U.S.-Israeli relationship, it
seems clear that it would be easier for the
United States to convey its intentions to its
close ally, but Syria is another matter
altogether. It is not too much to suggest
that the United States may be wandering
into the unknown insofar as it is integrating
Syria into a coercive framework backed by
U.S. nuclear weapons. It seems eminently
unclear whether Bashar Asad realizes that
he is being subjected to certain coercive
and compellant strategies that are poten-
tially backed up by nuclear weapons.  It is
also manifestly unclear whether the U.S.
deterrent plays any role in the Syrian
decision-making calculus on conflict
escalation or even surprise attack.  If the
NPR’s assertions about the central impor-
tance of deterring attacks against Israel
and actively defending it are to be taken
seriously, one would expect that Bashar
Asad should be made aware that escala-
tion in situations like the October 2003
Israeli strike could potentially lead to a
U.S. response.
In Syria and its leader Bashar Asad,
the United States faces a superficially
similar situation to the one it faced with
Saddam during the 1990s: an authoritarian
leader, most probably operating on limited
and imperfect information with a decision-
making environment characterized by
relatively few actors.  A main motivation
for Asad is to maintain his hold on power.
The internal political environment is also to
some extent opaque – as it was in Iraq. Yet
understanding this environment is crucial to
devising a communications strategy that
can accurately convey intent.  In seeking to
operationalize coercive and compellant
strategies against Syria backed by the
threat of force, the United States must
once again also confront the communica-
tions issues so vital to the functioning of
coercive strategy.  Accurately conveying
intent is essential.  Confronting these
communications issues forces the United
States into critical analysis of Bashar
Asad’s structure of internal and external
images through which intent has to be
communicated.  These images, which are
functions of the leader’s personality and
historical experiences, also seem indelibly
etched by a particular regional culture – as
undefined and amorphous as that term
seems.  Reduced to its most basic level, the
essential issue becomes this: How does the
United States convey intent with Bashar
Asad, and what indices can we develop to
ensure that the signals are being received?
Deterrence and Regional Rogues
As previously noted, the Bush
administration’s strategy documents almost
universally assert that so-called rogue
regimes are not subject to deterrence.  The
absence of the deterrent restraint on these
actors (as well as non-state actors) is one
of the underlying assumptions in the
administration’s arguments calling for pre-
emptive military action and preventive war.
Analysts have vigorously challenged
the Bush administration’s assumptions on
these issues.  Two of the most prominent
of these are John Mearsheimer and
Stephen Walt, who made a persuasive case
that Saddam Hussein, for example, was
subject to deterrence and that the strategy
of containment exercised by the United
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States during the 1990s effectively limited
Saddam’s threat to region and the wider
international system.45    Walt has also
argued separately that the wider threat of
rogue states has been exaggerated.  He
argues that managing the insecurity of
these states is the central policy challenge
facing the United States, which can be
accomplished reasonably easily through
coalitions and alliances.46
Examining the applicability of deterrence
and containment strategies – as opposed to
dissuasive, compellance-based strategies – is
a critical issue for policy makers as they
think through the implications of applying the
strategic nuclear force in the region.  Deal-
ing with rogue regimes with containment
strategies as practiced during the Cold War
and in the Gulf during the 1990s suggests
that nuclear weapons (supported by conven-
tional force) can function as a useful
element in an overall strategy to manage the
security environment.
Assuming that there can be a useful
role for traditional deterrence vis-à-vis
adversaries suggests that the United States
should seek to construct regional political
and military coalitions backed by conven-
tional and strategic capabilities as the
underlying framework of regional security
and stability.  For example, using U.S.
advanced transformational military capa-
bilities and technologies to create a shared
system of situational awareness with
coalition militaries to create transparency
and trust could represent one building block
in a security architecture to minimize the
threat posed by anti-status-quo regimes.47
A critical component of a reconfigured
system of regional security could conceiv-
ably draw upon one of the U.S. arsenal’s
new components – strategic missile
defense.  A region-wide missile-defense
system, in combination with programs
initiated during the Clinton administration
under the auspices of the Cooperative
Defense Initiative against Weapons of
Mass Destruction, could serve as helpful
elements to strengthen deterrence through-
out the region. CDI, as it was called,
sought to encourage the Gulf states to
undertake a variety of measures to address
the possibility of attacks using WMD.
The “Demand” Side of Security
Applying U.S. strategic forces toward
a non-coercive, deterrence-based mission,
in the context of a broadly-based contain-
ment strategy also implicitly addresses the
demand side of the security equation. By
creating a system of transparency, trust
and confidence, states may feel less
threatened and have less motivation to
develop WMD capabilities.  A central
assumption of this argument is that insecu-
rity, which can flow from internal vulner-
abilities, is a cause for aggressive behav-
ior.48   By managing the external environ-
ment, regional states might be less inclined
to pursue threatening capabilities and
engage in aggressive behavior.  In such an
environment, a range of military capabili-
ties, including the strategic deterrent, could
be applied to form a seamless security
umbrella that makes all those under it feel
secure.  Defensive capabilities, as noted
above, could form part of the umbrella.
But in the Middle East, theory inevita-
bly collides with reality.  Intransigent and
enduring sources of conflict seem impervi-
ous to all attempts to reduce tensions and
promote cooperation on a region-wide
basis.  These sources of conflict limit what
the United States can expect to achieve by
extending its strategic umbrella throughout
the region.  The extension of a security
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umbrella, including forward deployed
forces, only exacerbates the security
dilemma of some of the regional states,
most notably Iran and to a lesser extent
Syria.  Iran views the U.S. military pres-
ence in the region as a threat to its security
and is almost certainly not interested in
being “assured” by the strategic deterrent
– except in a negative context.
Policy Lessons from Iraq?
In hindsight and given available infor-
mation, it is difficult to underestimate the
impact of misperception and communica-
tions issues on the coercive framework
used throughout the 1991-2003 period by
the United States against Iraq.49    There
are important lessons in this case as policy
makers address the role of strategic
weaponry, especially nuclear arms, in
regional security strategy.
The stated objectives of U.S. policies
were threefold (and not necessarily mutu-
ally supportive): deter Iraqi attacks against
its neighbors and mitigate Iraq’s military
threat to the region; seek Iraq’s compliance
with a variety of U.N. Security Council
resolutions, the most of important of which
was verifiable disarmament; and simulta-
neously (from 1997 onward) topple Saddam
by encouraging internal and external
opponents.  Throughout the decade, the
United States used a variety of diplomatic,
economic and military tools in the context
of a broad-based strategy of compellance
and deterrence to achieve these objectives.
The United States deployed forces engaged
in ongoing military operations to enforce a
U.N. trade embargo and simultaneously
denied Iraq control over much of its own
airspace.  It used its influence in the U. N.
Security Council to isolate Iraq politically
and took a leadership role in trying to
ensure the efficacy of the U. N. arms-
inspection process pursuant to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687.  Force
was used repeatedly throughout the period
in response to various objectionable behav-
iors by the regime.
The U.S. approach towards Iraq
represented a classic mix of deterrent and
compellant strategies.  The threat of force
was always present, varying in intensity
throughout the period, depending on the
crisis du jour, and specific attacks were
launched in 1993, 1996 and 1998.  A
pattern emerged during the decade:
defiance by Saddam resulted in U.S.
military deployments into the region
accompanied by repeated statements of
intent to use force.   These crises either
were resolved with a political compromise
at the United Nations or, alternately, U.S.
attacks.  This pattern continued until
December 1998, when the United Nations
withdrew its inspectors and the United
States mounted Operation Desert Fox.
Following these strikes, the rules of en-
gagement for U.S. forces patrolling the no-
fly zones were expanded, allowing a more
systematic and sustained military campaign
against the Iraqi air-defense system and
command-and-control network throughout
southern Iraq.
The approach taken by the United
States reflected important elements of
Schelling’s bargaining process: use the
threat and actual use of force in tandem
with public statements as tools to convey
intent in pursuit of an objective. Escalation
followed rhetoric if Saddam did not comply.
Saddam’s defiance during the period
seemed to confirm a prevailing view that
the United States was dealing with a
dangerous and recalcitrant “realist” whose
main motivation was to remain in power
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and continue defying the international
community by preserving his WMD
programs.  Saddam’s refusal to provide
information to correct discrepancies in
declarations to the U.N. weapons inspec-
tors and the discovery of the so-called
“concealment mechanism” during the
tenure of U.N. Special Commission
Chairman Richard Butler only confirmed a
prevailing view that Saddam had stocks of
WMD stored just out of reach of inspec-
tors.  After all, so the reasoning went, why
would he go to such lengths and endure the
wrath of the international community?
But in retrospect it appears that the
other actor in the coercive bargaining
framework (Saddam) was working off an
asymmetrical series of motivations and had
developed images that were, for the most
part, opaque to the United States (if not the
entire international community).  The
asymmetrical interests and opaque images
meant the signals and indices used by each
side were more like ships passing in the
night than signals conveyed by rational
actors communicating in a calculated
interstate bargaining process. Saddam
consciously manipulated both signals and
indices to deceive a variety of different
internal and external actors.  And he was
resoundingly successful in his deception.
The United States and the international
community bought it, hook, line and sinker.
Further, Saddam’s motivations and
images were strongly rooted in the region’s
cultural and behavioral norms – a critical
one being not to lose face.  The need for
Saddam to preserve credibility with his
neighbors and internal opponents formed
an important, perhaps even defining,
element of Iraq’s external image. Saddam
clung to these core beliefs and the support-
ing image beyond what anyone could have
thought was rational.  While the United
States correctly perceived the importance
Saddam attached to his WMD programs
for regional and international credibility, it
never caught on to the deception, in part
because it seemed illogical and
counterintuitive.   While U.S. diplomatic
and military actions undoubtedly had some
coercive and deterrent value, these actions
also had the unintended effect of reinforc-
ing what Saddam wanted the rest of the
world to believe: that he retained significant
WMD stocks.   For the United States, the
disconnect between the signals made
pursuant to the coercive policy objectives
and the actions of the target could not have
been more pronounced.
In retrospect, it seems clear that
asymmetrical interests, misperception (fed
by intelligence failures) and communica-
tions problems affected the coercive
bargaining framework.  Indeed, it is
unclear to what degree the framework was
operating at all in accordance with
Schelling’s paradigm.  The implications of
this analysis for the months preceding
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are signifi-
cant.  As was the case in Gulf War I, a
variety of senior U.S. officials, including
President Bush, stated that Iraqi use of
chemical and/or biological weapons against
U.S. forces or coalition partners would be
met with an overwhelming, i.e., nuclear,
response.  U.S. troops expected that Iraq
would in fact use its chemical and biologi-
cal weapons in response to the invasion,
suggesting that the National Command
Authority would have been placed in the
position of having to make the decision on
using nuclear weapons against Iraqi forces
or regime targets.  From the U.S. perspec-
tive, the public declarations and the history
of Iraqi non-use of chemical/biological
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weapons in Gulf War I suggested that
deterrence could play a role in the coercive
framework and discourage Saddam from
first use.  But if the preceding analysis
about the inherent weaknesses in the
coercive framework is only partially
correct, it suggests that both parties had
entered a blind alley in the months before
OIF.  The United States believed that the
coercive framework was fully operational
and that deterrence could play a useful
role.  But if the post-war reports are any
indication, it seems unclear whether
Saddam was capable of taking the actions
expected by U.S. decision makers within
this framework or was receiving any of the
intended signals.  In short, the United
States and Iraq were in a strategically
unstable environment in which uncontrolled
escalation could have flowed relatively
easily due to actions by either party.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis suggests that
U.S. strategic forces, including the nuclear
weapons arsenal, hold both promise and
problems as tools to help manage the
regional security environment.  In my
judgment, the primary value of U.S. forces
is not in the realm of coercion,
compellance and dissuasion, in which
actors are made to reverse actions already
undertaken or change their entire foreign
policy and security strategy to conform
with U.S. goals in the region.  Rather, the
main value of the arsenal lies with support-
ing the broadly defined political objectives
of deterrence and assurance.  If com-
bined with a security environment charac-
terized by cooperation, transparency and
trust, U.S. strategic weaponry could act as
a stabilizing factor in the security environ-
ment – at least for those states participating
in the framework.  This suggests that the
central policy challenge facing the United
States is to craft a regional environment
that builds relationships among cooperative
states while simultaneously managing
threats from anti-status-quo regimes.
Using U.S. strategic forces, including
nuclear-weapons forces, as part of a
coercive interstate bargaining framework
appears more problematic.  In the Middle
East, it seems clear that the United States
must address communications issues
surrounding the conveyance of intent on
which the bargaining process depends.
Lessons of the 13-year experience with
Iraq are not particularly encouraging.  A
cursory review of the interaction with Iraq
suggests serious communications discon-
nects.  While the United States effectively
“got lucky,” since Saddam’s cupboard was
bare, it would be a mistake to conclude that
Iraq’s non-use of WMD in Operation Iraqi
Freedom is a useful model for the future.
An unfortunate conclusion out of the Iraq
case is that systemic communications
difficulties in fact make pre-emptive action
that much more attractive in situations
where there can be no confidence that the
coercive framework is functioning with any
degree of predictability.
These lessons seem particularly
germane to the ongoing Israeli-Syrian
relationship, with the potential for escala-
tion on both sides, which by extension
involves the United States through its
commitment to Israel.  Variances between
U.S. and Israeli views of deterrence and
compellance should be closed if the United
States wants its strategic deterrent to
function in a constructive way to achieve
its policy objectives with both parties.
Moreover, deciphering the series of images
motivating Syrian leader Bashar Asad
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seems equally important if the United
States is to construct a communications
system that can accurately convey intent.
One conclusion of this analysis is that
policy makers must address communica-
tions issues, images and perceptions before
using strategic nuclear forces in any
regional coercive-bargaining framework. In
the Middle East and elsewhere, systemic
communications problems, complicated by
cross-cultural issues, impose enormous
difficulties in operationalizing nuclear
weaponry as an instrument of coercive and
compellant strategies.   But the promise of
using nuclear and conventional weapons
purely as a strategic deterrent – that is,
for providing an open-ended and admittedly
ambiguous deterrent presence for a
cooperative regional security environment
– should not be minimized.  Using nuclear
weapons in this traditional sense of deter-
ring aggression, as one supporting element
in an overall system of managing regional
security, suggests that U.S. policy should
concentrate on the demand-side of the
policy equation, to create a system of
transparency and trust with all regional
states.
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